Understanding the Bible
Jack wrote this for the original project that eventually became The Language of
God.
*****
As biblical inerrantists, we believe the Bible to be an infallible source of objective revelation. Assuming that it is, one would expect all like-minded Bible students to agree on what it teaches. But that is not the case. There is wide disagreement about what constitutes true, biblical Christianity. Yet each differing viewpoint appeals to the authoritative teaching of the Bible. It would appear that the Bible does not teach the same thing to everyone who reads it. There are as many different versions of the Bible's teaching as there are people interpreting it.
Anyone who has ever argued about the meaning of the Bible knows how difficult it is to resolve disagreements. One example—out of hundreds which could be cited—is a fundamental disagreement among Christians as to the extent to which Jesus' death has redemptive value.[1] Most Bible students can agree that Jesus' death paid the due penalty for man's rebellion against God. Many believe that Jesus' death paid this penalty for every human being throughout all time. (This group is said to believe in the doctrine of unlimited atonement.) Others are persuaded that it paid this penalty only for "the elect"—a select group of individuals whom God has chosen to save. According to this view, Jesus did die for the elect; he did not die for the non-elect. Likewise, God will save "the elect"; he will not save the non-elect. (This group is said to believe in the doctrine of limited atonement.)
I John 2:2 explicitly addresses the redemptive value of Jesus' death:
"… and He Himself is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world." (NASV)
The verse, however, does not end the argument between limited and unlimited atonement. The proponent of unlimited atonement takes a firm and confident stand on such a verse:
John says "for the sins of the whole world." If he says "the whole world," he means the whole world. He means that Jesus died for every single individual in the whole world.
The verse is easily and naturally interpreted in a way which supports his belief in unlimited atonement.
The proponent of limited atonement, on the other hand, sees absolutely no conflict between his theology and the teaching of this verse:
If John were saying here that Jesus' death is a propitiation for every individual in the whole world, then, of course, I am wrong to believe in limited atonement. But John is not saying that. His point is that the value of Jesus' death to appease God's wrath is not limited to the Jews (or, for that matter, to any other race). The group of people that will enjoy God's forgiveness will include individuals from every race, every nationality, and every slice of humanity. Jesus' propitiation is for the elect; but God does not show partiality when he chooses his elect. The elect will come from every race and from every corner of the globe. That is John's point.
This verse does not explicitly advocate limited atonement. That he freely admits. But neither does it exclude it. There is a perfectly reasonable way to construe I John 2:2 which sees it as totally compatible with the truth of limited atonement.
Even if both our debaters here are intelligent, sincere, teachable, believing people, there will still be no meeting of minds. As long as the advocate of limited atonement believes that limited atonement is true, he will be unpersuaded of his antagonist's understanding of the text. And so long as the advocate of unlimited atonement believes that unlimited atonement is true, he will view his interpretation as perfectly self-evident. The two sides are at an impasse.
How is it that two equally intelligent, sincere, honest, pious, and faithful people do not reach the same understanding of I John 2:2? Where is its objective meaning? Can the verse only say what the interpreter wants it to say? Only what the interpreter's theological assumptions demand that it say? This would seem to be the case. As goes your theology, so goes your interpretation of the verse.
The phenomenon described above is not unique to I John 2:2. What we see there is repeated verse after verse throughout the Bible. Virtually every text of Scripture is amenable to several different interpretations, all of which are "possible" (i.e., plausible, intelligent, and reasonable). What's worse, deeper and more-detailed study does not narrow the field of "possible" interpretations. It broadens it.
We should be troubled by the obvious question this raises: What is it about the process of interpreting the Bible that makes it so subjective? And how can an alleged source of objective revelation appear to have no objective meaning at all? This is a very important question. One of the primary purposes of this chapter is to give it a satisfactory answer.[2]
There are two unsatisfactory answers one might give to the question: (1) everyone else is inept; or (2) I am inept.
It would be easy if I could dismiss everyone who disagrees with me as stupid, ignorant, careless, insincere, or unbelieving. If one is to arrive at the objective meaning of the text, he must certainly take care in his interpretation of it; he must interpret it knowledgeably and intelligently; and he must pursue its meaning out of a sincere interest in the truth. Much of the failure to reach the objective meaning of the biblical text can legitimately be explained as the result of one or more of these personal flaws among its students. Many Bible students are ignorant, stupid, careless, or deficient in the necessary integrity—i.e., they are not committed to truth; they would readily manipulate the text for their own selfish ends.
If all the disagreement could be traced to this sort of inadequacy in the other interpreters, then the Bible's seeming lack of objective meaning could be clearly seen to be an illusion. There is an objective meaning—most likely the interpretation which I and all other unflawed interpreters agree on. But it isn't that easy. If I am open and honest, I must admit that those who oppose me are usually not so easily discredited. They appear to be knowledgeable, intelligent, disciplined, and sincere in their faith. Their interpretation is not the result of ineptness, insincerity, or unbelief. Something else is at work. If ultimately they are wrong, it is not because of some obvious personal inadequacy as a Bible student. If there is some subtle and hidden inadequacy (and ultimately I will argue that there is), it is well-masked by the complexity of the interpretive process.[3]
According to an honest surface appraisal, there are equally sincere and capable Bible students who disagree with me on the meaning of the Bible. Only presumption and arrogance could let me dismiss their interpretations as obviously wrong-headed. I must confront the question as it truly presents itself to me:
If the Bible is God's objective revelation to man, then how can equally capable and sincere Bible students fail to reach agreement on the meaning of the biblical text?
It would be just as hasty to simply dismiss myself. I cannot assume that I am the one who is inept or insincere. It is not as if I am the odd man out. It is not that all other Bible students agree with one another and I, alone, diverge in my interpretation. None of the others agree with one another either. When all is said and done (and with little exaggeration), there are as many different interpretations of the Bible as there are people to interpret it. Even worse, there are as many different interpretations of the Bible as there are sincere, intelligent, faithful, knowledgeable people to interpret it. On the surface, therefore, my claim to understand the Bible is no less valid than the next person's.
So the question remains: How can so many capable Christians read the same Bible and yet arrive at so many different and conflicting conclusions? If the Bible is the infallible, inerrant word of God, if it is absolutely true, and if it reveals the truth for everyone, everywhere, universally, then why does it seem to say such radically different and contradictory things to the different people who study it?
Subjective Meaning vs.Objective Meaning
Before we can answer this question, I must distinguish between the objective meaning
of a text and the subjective meaning of a text.
The objective meaning of a text is the meaning that truly resides in the text and is present there for anyone to discover. Our firm belief is that the objective meaning of a biblical text (as of all written texts) is the meaning that its human author intended it to convey. It is the meaning that the human author put there.
The objective meaning of a text is the meaning that the human author of that text intended it to convey to a reader.
In contrast, the subjective meaning of a text is that text's meaning as construed by a particular interpreter. The advocate of limited atonement interprets I John 2:2 one way. That is its subjective meaning relative to him. His theological opponent (the advocate of unlimited atonement) interprets I John 2:2 another way. That is its subjective meaning relative to this opponent.
Both interpreters believe that the subjective meaning which they ascribe to the text is the objective meaning of the text. That is, they believe that the meaning they ascribe to the text coincides with the meaning that John (its author) intended it to convey. Yet both must acknowledge that the meaning they ascribe to to the text results from their own personal decisions. They did interpret the text. They did decide what meaning to ascribe to it. Each may be firmly convinced that his interpretation is a discovery of the objective meaning of the text. Nevertheless, each interpretation is, at the same time, a subjective meaning of the text. It is a personally-constructed interpretation of the text's objective meaning. In point of fact, in the case of one of these interpreters, the subjective meaning does not coincide with the objective meaning.
The subjective meaning of a Biblical text is the meaning which an individual interpreter ascribes to that text as its objective meaning as a result of his seeking to interpret it.
The distinction should be clear by now: the objective meaning of a text is the actual meaning which its author, in fact, put there; a subjective meaning is the understanding of that text which a given interpreter might reach. We can now frame the fundamental question of this chapter differently, using our newly-defined terms.
Our view of biblical authority involves the belief that the objective meaning of the biblical text is infallible, absolutely without falsehood of any kind. But in order for biblical infallibility to be relevant, its objective meaning must be discoverable by the reader. But if the objective meaning is discoverable, one might expect substantial agreement in the subjective meanings of the biblical texts. But this is not the case. There is a wide disparity in the subjective meanings of any given text. This is the fundamental puzzle we need to explore:
Why are there so many different subjective meanings of every biblical text?
The beginning of an answer lies in the concept of the pre-understanding and the role it plays in biblical interpretation. The pre-understanding makes a significant contribution to the subjective meaning of a text. To understand the contribution that it makes is to begin to develop an answer to the fundamental question before us.
The Concept of Pre-understanding
As I sit alone late at night, I hear a strange and unfamiliar moaning coming from upstairs. It is unlike any sound I have ever heard. I don't know what it is. I don't know what to think. I don't believe in ghosts. I don't believe that the spirits of dead people come back and haunt places in the here and now. (Whether I am right to disbelieve is unimportant. The fact that I do disbelieve is all that matters.) What am I to conclude about the strange, unfamiliar sound I am hearing? Do I think, For goodness sakes, that must be a ghost. And here I've always thought there were no such things. I guess there are ghosts after all.
No, of course not. I scour my knowledge searching for a "logical" explanation—an explanation which is logically consistent with what I already "know" to be true. Only the person who is already convinced that ghosts exist is prepared to believe that he is hearing a ghost. Given my conviction that ghosts do not exist, I will not entertain the ghost theory as a serious possibility.
We interpret all of our experience in just this way. We always seek to understand our present experience in the light of what we already "know," in the light of what we are already convinced is true. This is not advice as to how we should interpret our experience. It is a description of how we do, in fact, attempt to understand it. Every attempt to understand our experience is always made in the light of an understanding of reality which we already had going into the experience. I always assume that experience will be compatible with my prior understanding and will confirm it. I do not assume that my prior understanding will be overturned.
All of us, by adulthood, have very sophisticated, well-developed theories about reality. Our commitment to these theories may be more unconscious than conscious, but we hold them nonetheless. They include all sorts of beliefs about everything: the nature and origin of reality and existence, innumerable facts about reality, values, the source of those values, morals, the source of those morals, and even method—i.e., how we ought to do what we do. We even hold theories as to how to form beliefs—i.e., how we ought to decide what to believe.
These theories—this collection of beliefs and convictions—which make up our current understanding of reality in all its aspects is what philosophers have come to call our pre-understanding.[4] Presumably, the prefix "pre-" arises from the fact that pre-understanding is always discussed in the context of interpretation. Every experience which we have requires us to interpret it. Experiences do not interpret themselves to us—i.e., they do not carry their own meaning and significance with them. What meaning and significance they have for us we must ascribe to them. Pre-understanding, according to the philosopher's use of that term, describes the understanding of reality which one already possesses as he enters into a given experience. It is in the light of just such an understanding that he will interpret that experience. Presumably, it is because pre-understanding describes the understanding which he had before the given experience even occurred that the prefix "pre-" suggests itself to the philosopher. The term pre-understanding, therefore, makes sense if we recognize that it describes the existing state of our understanding prior to the occurrence of some specific experience in need of interpretation.
My pre-understanding, at any given time, is the state of my understanding of reality in terms of which I try to make sense out of my experience.
The pre-understanding is not static, but dynamic. It changes and gets constantly modified as I alter my beliefs and convictions. What it was last year is not what it is today. Over the course of time I reject some of my former beliefs and embrace new ones. With each change in my belief system, my pre-understanding is altered.
The Pre-understanding Makes Knowledge Possible
The pre-understanding makes human reasoning economical enough to be possible. Since we "know" that our current understanding is true, we extend our understanding of reality further by interpreting our experience so as to support and confirm this pre-understanding. In other words, we assume the validity of our pre-understanding and interpret our experience in the light of it. If we felt compelled to prove the truth of our pre-understanding (and felt no freedom to simply assume that it was true) before we could interpret our experience in terms of it, we would be paralyzed, unable to function. It is utterly impractical to justify every belief we wish to use every time we wish to use it. It is because we can assume a whole network of beliefs to be true (without feeling compelled to justify them each time) that human reasoning is possible.
Interpreting from the Pre-understanding is Rational
Assuming the truth of one's pre-understanding is not merely a matter of expedience. There is a distinct logic to it as well. We have the pre-understanding we do because we are convinced it is true. This should be obvious. It would be rather incongruous to hold beliefs we thought were not true.[5] Consequently, it is logical for us to assume our pre-understanding and use it as the starting-point of our interpretation.
According to logic, conclusions which have been logically-derived from true premises will be true. No such guarantee attaches to conclusions which have been logically-derived from false premises. If I know my premises are true, then I know that what logically follows from them is true. If my premises happen to be false, there is no guarantee. What logically follows may be false. Therefore, from a pre-understanding which we "know" to be true (as from true premises), we can reason to an understanding of our experience which we know to be true. This method (which we all instinctively use) is perfectly compatible with the nature of logic and reason.
Interpreting from Pre-understanding is God's Intention
Interpreting experience in the light of one's pre-understanding is, as we have seen, inevitable. It is also universal, rationally-appropriate, and practical to the point of being invaluable. It is undoubtedly the way God intended for humans to construct their knowledge. It does not merely describe how we, in fact, develop our knowledge. It describes what God has ordained.
The way to know, as God himself designed it, is for us to form an understanding of our experience and then assume the validity of that understanding as we attempt to understand future experience. In such a way, learning will be cumulative. Understanding will give rise to further understanding which will give rise to still further understanding.
If this accurately describes the progression of knowledge as God designed it, the possibility of any knowledge requires an initial deposit of knowledge from which we can start. Is this plausible? Can we make sense out of an "initial deposit of knowledge"?
The beginning of knowing
Consider the newborn infant's first confrontation with the outside world. We look at his environment and see a quiet, peaceful nursery—a crib with a mobile over it, a changing table, a dresser, a lamp, a rocking chair, a rug on the floor, colorful pictures on the wall. What does the infant see? Most likely, what we see as a peaceful and orderly environment, he "sees" as a bewildering chaos of colors, sounds, smells, textures, and tastes.[6] What we know to be a poster hanging on the wall, he sees as a patch of colors in the midst of a larger patch of colors. What's worse, it is a dynamic collage, always changing, constantly in motion. Whether he feels the pull of the muscles moving his eyes or not, the collage is constantly moving.
How does the newborn infant, confronted with this hopelessly chaotic experience ever come to see and recognize the order which is in it? In other words, how can he ever come to know what we know. How does he come to recognize the geometric pattern of colors as a dresser? How does he come to recognize that other shape and color pattern as his mother's face? One important observation about a child's coming to knowledge is inescapable:
The human infant could never come to know anything if he did not already know something.
If the human child were not born with certain important pieces of fundamental knowledge, then no knowledge would be possible. Let me illustrate.
Consider the thoughts, if they could be made articulate, which would pass through an infant's mind if he began with absolutely no knowledge.[7] The infant is several days old and has opened his eyes on numerous occasions to see his mother's face staring at him:
Look at that! There it is again. That peculiar combination of shapes and colors. I
saw that just a little while ago, and I have seen it several times now altogether. It's
amazing that all those shifting shapes and colors out there would come together in just
that particular pattern so often. That's a really amazing coincidence, if it is a
coincidence. I wonder. Perhaps there is some rational explanation for it. Maybe there is
something out there which causes those shapes and colors to be that way. Oh well! There is
no way to tell. It could be caused by something, but it might just be a coincidence. I
guess I'll never know.
The infant has reached an impasse in his quest for understanding. He has no logical basis for believing that his experience is rationally-ordered rather than the result of pure randomness. But without knowing that, he has no way of knowing whether his experience is being caused by some outside world and thereby providing him with reliable information about it.
By way of contrast, consider the reasoning which would go on in the thinking of an infant who already "knew" that his perceptions were the orderly effects of an outside world which caused them:
Look at that! There it is again. That peculiar combination of shapes and colors. I
saw that just a little while ago, and I have seen it several times now altogether. It's
amazing that all those shifting shapes and colors out there would get together in just
that particular pattern so often. Somehow there is a logical explanation for why that same
pattern keeps recurring. I'll have to keep looking for it and studying it and find out
more about it. Perhaps I can learn what it is that always causes me to see that
pattern.
Because this infant "knows" that pure coincidence is not a true explanation of his experience, he is poised to allow the orderliness of his experience to be significant—i.e., to tell him something about the outside world. This is a clear contrast to the infant who does not "know" that pure coincidence is not a valid option. The latter infant is paralyzed by the logic of his situation. Hence, he could never learn anything from his experience.
This is a crucial realization. Assume that the human infant was completely void of any and all knowledge at any level. The only capability of his newly formed brain was to translate external stimuli into isolated subjective experiences of taste, color, smell, texture, and sound. The consequence would be life-long infancy with no growth in knowledge whatsoever. The infant would never come to an orderly, intelligent understanding of external reality. Instead, the whole of his existence would consist of a perpetual, dynamic, chaotic collage of unconnected, unrelated visceral experiences.
This example illustrates the earlier claim that the human infant could never come to know anything if it did not already know something. It shows that the acquisition of knowledge by an infant is possible only on the assumption that it has a built-in, instinctive knowledge of at least one proposition. He must "know" (at the very least) that his experience is caused by an external objective reality and is rationally-ordered in a manner corresponding to the rational structure of that objective reality. So, to at least this extent, human beings are capable of acquiring knowledge precisely because they already have some knowledge. Knowledge makes understanding possible. It is because we already understand some things that we are able to learn from our experiences and acquire new understanding.
As Christians, of course, we believe that the human infant is created by God with the foundational knowledge necessary to make all other knowledge possible. God built it in. The baby possesses that initial knowledge in the very structure of his human intelligence. His initial grasp of those first essential truths is innate and instinctive.
To draw an analogy with computers, the human infant has a certain Read-Only-Memory[8] created by God. A computer would be
completely and utterly worthless without its ROM. The computer's ROM consists of certain
key pieces of information which the inventor of the computer has built the computer to
"know" without having to be taught. It is knowledge that is literally built into
the physical structure of the machine. It is because of its ROM that the computer can be
"taught" (by software) to perform its other functions. It is on the basis of his
God-created ROM that the human infant is able to learn from experience about the outside
world. It is not necessary here that we be able to list what our God-given ROM includes.
One such truth was indicated above. But there must certainly be others. It probably
includes a built-in grasp of the laws of logic; and it likely includes the foundational
assumptions which underlie moral reasoning. But whatever ought to be included in our
analysis of this ROM, the important point is this: there is an initial built-in ROM in
human beings which makes human knowing possible. Apart from such a built-in ROM, no
knowledge at all would be possible.
This is exactly what we would expect if it is true that God designed the knowing process to build on previous knowledge already acquired—i.e., to build on our pre-understanding. The very beginning of all knowledge, therefore, (as we have speculatively understood it) stands as a paradigm for all knowing whatsoever:
We extend our knowledge of reality by interpreting our experience of reality in terms of our pre-understanding.
the Conservative nature of knowing
If God has structured human knowing to work by building on pre-understanding, then it has a very important consequence:
All interpretation of my experience is done in the light of my pre-understanding.
This is not only what does occur, it is also what should occur. It is just as God designed human knowing to work. To put it another way, God designed human knowing to be conservative. He designed human knowing to preserve, so far as possible, the knower's current understanding of reality. Instead of inventing a whole new theory of reality to explain my experience every time I encounter something new, God designed the process of knowing so that I seek to understand all new experiences in the light of my current theory of reality.
Suppose a modern atheist were to read the Bible's account of the resurrection of Jesus. Given his pre-understanding, what is the appropriate response that he, as a human knower, should make. Should he say,"Oh, I get it. There is a god after all. Jesus was his chosen Messiah, and God raised him from the dead!"
No. Such a response would be in complete violation of his God-given design as a knower. Rather, his response ought to go something like this:
"Well, I know that all that stuff about God and miracles and Jesus' being the chosen representative of God is absurd. Jesus was not really raised from the dead. That is impossible. The only logical explanation is that his resurrection is a purely legendary account. It does not represent any actual historical event which occurred."
Given the atheist's understanding, there is no other reasonable way for him to understand how the biblical text got to be what it did.
From the Christian (and biblical) point of view, the atheist is not wrong to interpret the resurrection in the light of the atheism to which he is committed. That is the right and natural way for him as a human knower to proceed. He is wrong for being a committed atheist to begin with. He is wrong because he begins with a faulty understanding, not because he interprets life in the light of it. He is wrong for having a pre-understanding which he ought not have.
The resurrection is not, and cannot be, a sign to the committed atheist. The resurrection was intended to be a sign, first and foremost, to the contemporary Jew. He was already a theist. In the context of a theistic pre-understanding (and especially in the context of a first-century Jewish pre-understanding), the resurrection is full of significance as to the identity of Jesus and the purposes of God. But, interpreted in the light of any other pre-understanding, it does not have the same significance. If one is to have a true understanding of the meaning of Jesus' resurrection, he must start with a true pre-understanding. To the extent that one's pre-understanding is false, his understanding of the resurrection will be false.
If we are to persuade the atheist of the gospel, it does no good to present him with the claim of Jesus' resurrection.[9] Jesus' resurrection does not mean to him what it means to the Christian. First, he must be persuaded to believe that a transcendent God exists and is the maker of the world. He must be persuaded that, by interpreting life and reality in the light of atheism, he is interpreting it in the light of a faulty pre-understanding. Only then will other facts (like the resurrection) take on the right significance to him.
Pre-understanding in Biblical Interpretation
Understanding the role of the pre-understanding in human knowing is a very important aspect of a biblical theory of knowledge. As we have seen, it has important ramifications for apologetics and evangelism. But, our concern in this book is biblical interpretation. The rest of the chapter will concentrate on the consequences which the nature of human knowing has for the process of biblical interpretation.
Pre-Understanding and
the Subjective Meaning of the Text
As we have seen, the nature of human knowing determines that one will interpret any life experience in the light of his own pre-understanding. This applies to literally every life experience—including the experience of understanding language. Verbal communication is one of the experiences of life where interpretation is done in the light of one's pre-understanding. The verbal communication present in the Bible is no exception. We interpret what the Bible is saying to us in the light of the pre-understanding we bring with us to the text. Let me illustrate with two passages: Matthew 16:13-20 and John 3:16.
Matthew 16: 13–20
When Jesus came to the region of Caesarea Philippi, He asked his disciples, "Who do people say the Son of Man is?"
They replied, "Some say John the Baptist; others say Elijah; and still others, Jeremiah or one of the prophets."
"But what about you?" he asked. "Who do you say I am?"
Simon Peter answered, "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God."
Jesus replied, "Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah, for this was not revealed to you by man, but by my Father in heaven. And I tell you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not overcome it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven." Then he warned his disciples not to tell anyone that he was the Christ. (NASV)
Traditional Roman Catholic doctrine holds that Peter was the first pope and that all popes subsequent to him hold their authority by succession from him. The doctrine of papal succession holds that Jesus established a single human being—the pope—to wield Jesus' authority in his place, and that Peter was the first such pope. If I approach this passage with the firm conviction that this traditional Roman Catholic doctrine is true, it is obvious that Jesus, in this particular account in Matthew, is giving expression to just this doctrine. Peter is the "rock" precisely because he is the first pope—the very first, foundational representative of Jesus. Peter's holding the "keys to the kingdom of heaven" such that "whatever he binds on earth will be bound in heaven" is quite obviously a reference to the papal authority which Jesus is granting him. Once I understand that Jesus is referring to the reality of Peter's papal authority, I can understand the Matthew account by interpreting Jesus' words to Peter in the light of what I already know about papal authority. Jesus gave Peter exactly that authority in the early church that the Roman church says the pope has today.
The Protestant does not share the Roman Catholic's understanding of the papacy. Indeed, he does not believe the papacy is a biblical institution at all. He believes it to be a vain human invention. So the Protestant is unconvinced by the Catholic's interpretation of Matthew 16:13-20. To the Protestant, it makes much more sense to understand Jesus' words as a reference to Peter's apostolic authority. (An authority he shared with the other apostles.) Jesus is instructing Peter, for the first time, on the special role of apostleship he is to fulfill. Peter's recently-received insight into the identity of Jesus (i.e., "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God.") is, Jesus is saying, the first installment of a gift which is to be given to Peter (and to the other apostles ). Specifically, the gift is an understanding of the nature of the kingdom of heaven. This gift—this understanding which Peter has even now begun to receive—will be the foundation upon which Jesus' church will be built. Peter's role (along with the other apostles) will be to impart this understanding (this gift) to others, thereby building up the church. Peter (and the other apostles) have a unique role and a unique sort of authority within Jesus' church. This understanding of the kingdom of heaven will be given to them in full measure and in perfection. Their understanding of the kingdom of heaven will be a flawless, infallible understanding—an understanding of the kingdom of heaven which originated in heaven itself ("... whatever you bind on earth will have been bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will have been loosed in heaven…"). So Peter (along with all the other apostles ) has been given the "keys of the kingdom of heaven." Peter, as an apostle, can unlock the gates of heaven for others, granting them access, by imparting to others his God-given insight into the identity of Jesus and the nature of his kingdom.
This Protestant interpretation is significantly different from the Catholic one. In the Protestant interpretation,[10] Jesus is instructing Peter about a role which he will share with others (the apostles). In the Catholic interpretation, Jesus is instructing Peter about a role that he will have uniquely, as an individual. In the Protestant interpretation, Jesus is telling Peter about an authority which is linked to the inspired understanding which has been granted him.[11] In the Catholic interpretation, Jesus is telling Peter about an authority which is an attribute of the office which has been granted him.[12]
The point is not to sort out who is right and who is wrong. The point is to illustrate the powerful affect our pre-understanding has on our biblical interpretation. If one already accepts the papal authority of Peter as true, then the Catholic interpretation of Matthew 16 is clearly the more likely one. It is not that the Catholic's interpretation becomes merely plausible in the light of a Roman Catholic pre-understanding; rather, his pre-understanding virtually requires his interpretation. But if one rejects the papal authority of Peter and acknowledges only the Protestant understanding of apostolic authority, then the Protestant interpretation of Matthew 16 is the most likely. Again, it is not that the Protestant interpretation is merely rendered possible. Given the Protestant's pre-understanding, he is forced to the interpretation he adopts. The point to note is:
The pre-understanding which one takes to a biblical text virtually determines how one must interpret that text.[13]
John 3: 16
For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. (NIV)
Consider how different the meaning of this very familiar verse is to the Calvinist as compared to the Arminian. The Calvinist is persuaded of God's sovereign control over the will and choices of men. The Arminian believes in the total autonomy of the human will. The Arminian understands Jesus to say:
Whoever, by an autonomous act of his own will, chooses (in complete independence from God ) to trust in the Son, this one will be granted eternal life.
For the Calvinist, however, these same words mean something very different:
Whoever genuinely trusts the Son gives evidence of the fact that he has been chosen by God to receive eternal life; for all who are chosen to receive the grace of eternal life receive (as a sign of their election) another gift as well - the disposition to trust in the Son.
The same simple words receive radically different interpretations due to the radically different pre-understandings that are brought to the text by the interpreter. Once again, the pre-understanding of the interpreter has been determinative in the interpretation which he gave to the biblical text.
These differing interpretations of Matthew 16:13-20 and John 3:16 illustrate a general principle:
The subjective meaning of a text is directly determined by the pre-understanding which the interpreter takes with him into the interpretation of that text.
We now have the beginning of an answer to the fundamental question with which we started: How do we explain the wide disparity in the subjective meanings of a biblical text? It is there because of the decisive role played by the pre-understanding. There is a wide divergence in the subjective meanings of a text precisely because there is a wide divergence in the pre-understandings which the different interpreters bring to the text. Two interpreters of equal intelligence, integrity, discipline, and sincerity will come to different interpretations of the same text if they begin with a substantially different pre-understanding.
We have more that needs to be said in answer to the fundamental question with which we are concerned. But the effect of the pre-understanding on the subjective meaning of a text is the initial insight which gives rise to our answer.
Pre-Understanding and the Objective Meaning of the Text
We have seen the effect which the interpreter's pre-understanding has on the subjective meaning of a text. It will be helpful to observe its effect on the objective meaning of a text. Just as the pre-understanding of an interpreter determines the subjective meaning he ascribes to a text, the pre-understanding of its author determines the objective meaning which is encoded in it. Stated as a principle, we have:
The objective meaning of a text is directly determined by the pre-understanding which the author takes with him into the writing of that text.
This principle has a noteworthy ramification:
To arrive at the true and accurate interpretation of a Biblical text, it is necessary to understand the pre-understanding which its author had when writing the text and to interpret the text in the light of that pre-understanding.
This is not always easy. It can be difficult to imaginatively reconstruct the biblical author's pre-understanding. But it must be done if one is to acquire a full and accurate understanding of the text.[14]
We begin to see more clearly how the wide disparity in biblical interpretations can occur. The uniformity of interpretation we expect is tied to a common grasp of the biblical author's pre-understanding. But grasping his pre-understanding can be a difficult and elusive quest. To the extent that all or most will fail, their interpretations of his text will miss the mark. Not only will they be wrong, but they will vary widely from one another as different interpreters make different sorts of mistakes.
The quest for a valid interpretation of a biblical text, then, is first and foremost this: a quest for the original pre-understanding in the mind of the biblical author which informed his thoughts and writings as he composed the text. This one fact poses a fundamental problem for biblical interpretation. The problem is this: How is interpretation possible in the light of the historical gap which leads to the hermeneutical circle ?
The Historical Gap
No two individuals have exactly the same pre-understanding. Our pre-understanding is shaped by our life experience, and our life experience is shaped by the unique circumstances which make up our lives. The greater the difference between people's life circumstances, the greater the difference between their pre-understandings.
It follows that two people from different cultures will find a greater distance between their pre-understandings than two people from the same culture. But even two people from the same culture, as similar as their life experience might be, will have passed through different sets of circumstances. As a consequence, even they, to some degree, will have come to different pre-understandings.
As we saw above, the fundamental problem in biblical interpretation is to understand the pre-understanding out of which the biblical author wrote.[15] The biblical author, being a different individual from the interpreter, does not automatically write from the same pre-understanding from which the interpreter interprets. The interpreter must not, therefore, interpret the text in the light of his own pre-understanding. He must seek to understand that very different pre-understanding out of which the author composed the text.
The gap between the biblical author and the biblical interpreter is much worse than the gap between two modern men. In addition to the ever-present gap between individuals, there is also a historical gap. The biblical author exists in a radically different place in history from the modern interpreter. He lived and thought in a different geographical place, in a different language, in a different culture, and in a different time. All of these differences combine to create a historical gap between the biblical author and us. Communication is difficult enough across the gap between two individuals. But when communication must also bridge this historical gap, it becomes immensely more difficult.
On each side of the historical gap exist radically different pre-understandings which have emerged from radically different life experiences. It is much greater than a mere culture gap alone—a gap which arises when two people live and think in different places, different languages, and different cultures, but in the same time in history. All else being different, by existing in the same time, there is much the two can share in common. But when they are separated in time, much of that common ground disappears. The more than nineteen hundred years separating the modern interpreter from the biblical author creates a huge chasm between them. Bridging this historical gap is the greatest difficulty in biblical interpretation. It creates for the interpreter two major problems:
First, given that a modern interpreter interpreting a text from the standpoint of his own pre-understanding will not and cannot reach a valid interpretation of the text, how can he avoid misinterpreting the biblical text from the standpoint of his own pre-understanding?
Second, do we have enough information to reconstruct the biblical author's pre-understanding?
The First Problem:
Our pre-understanding
We have already suggested that a valid interpretation of a biblical text is one which corresponds to the objective meaning of the text—i.e., the meaning which the author intended to convey when he composed it. The objective meaning, in turn, arises from the biblical author's own pre-understanding. At the same time, the subjective meaning which an interpreter finds in the text arises from his (the interpreter's) own pre-understanding. The historical gap between the biblical author and the interpreter guarantees that their pre-understandings will be significantly different. Hence, it follows that any interpretation which a modern interpreter gives to a Biblical text, interpreting it from the standpoint of his own pre-understanding, will not and cannot correspond to the objective meaning of the text. The objective meaning of the text was informed by a radically different pre-understanding, that of the historically distant biblical author.
There a way to overcome this problem—at least in theory. If the interpreter could interpret the biblical text from the standpoint of the Biblical author's pre-understanding rather than his own, then he could arrive at the objective meaning of the text. Herein lies an extremely important principle in the theory of biblical interpretation:
Valid interpretation of a Biblical text is possible only insofar as the interpreter adopts the pre-understanding of that text's author as the standpoint from which he interprets the text and does not interpret the text from the standpoint of his own pre-understanding.
The Skeptical Response
An objection can be raised at this point: Granted, in theory, it is possible to arrive at a valid interpretation by adopting the pre-understanding of the biblical author as one's interpretive standpoint. But in practice, this is not possible. It is never possible to step outside of one's own pre-understanding. My pre-understanding defines who I am. To step outside of my pre-understanding would be to step outside of myself. It cannot be done. It is psychologically impossible. All my beliefs about all my experience will always be informed by my pre-understanding. So the modern interpreter could never escape his own pre-understanding and adopt a radically different one. Hence, he could never adopt the biblical author's pre-understanding rather than his own. As a consequence, he could never arrive at the objective meaning of the text as we have defined it.
The skepticism about the possibility of discovering the objective meaning of the biblical text embodied in this objection is:
1) based on ignorance—on an inaccurate conception of how people form their beliefs;
2) fraudulent, insincere, and anti-intelligent—the fate suffered by all skepticism;
3) based on an exaggeration of the distance between the modern interpreter and the biblical author. Though the historical gap clearly does entail a distance between them, it is not as unbridgeably wide as this skepticism requires.
Skepticism is based on ignorance.
The skepticism about the possibility of discovering the objective meaning of the biblical text conceives of the pre-understanding as causing our interpretation of the biblical text like a mechanical cause causes a mechanical effect. It assumes that one's pre-understanding is absolutely determinative of the beliefs one holds and the interpretations one constructs. But this is not the case.
It is true that a mechanical cause determines its effect absolutely. A billiard ball colliding with a second billiard ball determines absolutely the second ball's speed and direction. But our pre-understanding does not shape our interpretation of the biblical text in the same mechanical way. Hence, one's interpretive conclusion does not follow from his pre-understanding out of absolute necessity. It is a strong influence on our interpretation, but it is not its cause.
Human beliefs are freely chosen. An act of volition is an integral part of belief-formation. We believe what we do because we have freely chosen to do so. Consequently, any belief is possible and any interpretation of the Bible is possible. Any conceivable interpretation of the text is open to us.
If this is so, why does it seem so inevitable that a given interpretation follow from a given pre-understanding. If our pre-understanding does not actually determine our interpretive choice absolutely, what makes it appear to do so? Two factors explain the strong influence which our pre-understanding has on our beliefs (and our biblical interpretation): habit and reason.
Our pre-understanding is our habitual way of viewing reality. Consequently, it takes no effort to interpret our experience (including the biblical text) in the light of our own pre-understanding. It comes naturally. But it takes a concerted effort to interpret our experience from the standpoint of any other understanding of reality. Therefore, unless we make a concerted effort to interpret the biblical text out of another pre-understanding, we will automatically interpret it from the standpoint of our own. By default, then, our own pre-understanding will usually be the one which shapes our interpretation. It is simply too difficult to interpret out of an alien pre-understanding and too easy to interpret out of our own.
The role of our pre-understanding is, in effect, to recommend an interpretation to us. But it recommends it to us on the most compelling basis possible: its reasonableness. As rational creatures (made to be rational by God himself), we will almost always find such a recommendation compelling. This puts our pre-understanding in a very powerful position. It is clearly our most influential counselor. But we must not lose sight of the fact that it is only that—a counselor. It does not mechanically cause our interpretation of the text; it recommends it to us. Because it recommends it on such a compelling basis to us—on its reasonableness, we almost always accept its recommendation. This creates the illusion that it causes our interpretations. But, in fact, we are ultimately free to reject its proposal. We are free to believe whatever we want, rational or irrational, true or false. Hence, we are ultimately free to interpret the biblical text however we want. We can choose to interpret it in the light of our own pre-understanding (i.e., to give it that interpretation which seems most "logical" in the light of our own understanding of reality); or we can choose to interpret it in the light of any other pre-understanding.
So the manner in which our beliefs are formed does not preclude any possible interpretation whatsoever. Clearly, we can interpret the text in the light of the biblical author's pre-understanding (if we can know what that is). Our pre-understanding cannot prevent us from doing so. By assuming that it can, the skeptical objection has totally misperceived the manner in which our beliefs are formed.
Granted, it is not easy to step outside one's own pre-understanding and adopt another's. It requires imagination and a disciplined effort. I must be able to imagine creatively another way of perceiving reality; and (for the sake of interpreting the biblical text) I must have the discipline to view reality from that other perspective even though it runs contrary to my habitual way of viewing things.
The skeptic may counter that his skepticism is not based on the assumption that beliefs are mechanically caused, but rather on the practical fact that to step outside of one's own pre-understanding is hopelessly difficult—so difficult that it is, for all practical purposes, impossible. This modified objection, however, naively underestimates the power of human intelligence. Human intelligence includes a creative imagination which is quite capable of imagining one's beliefs to be different from what they are. Further, it is capable of reasoning from those beliefs even as if they were one's own.
Likewise, this skepticism underestimates the human capability for intellectual discipline. It is not outside the reach of human intelligence to sympathetically and imaginatively embrace the pre-understanding of another. This ability to remain "open" to another way of looking at reality is a simple fact of human intelligence which this skepticism fails to take into account.[16]
The fallacy of this modified skepticism is easily demonstrated from our own experience. If it were impossible to step outside of one's own pre-understanding and imaginatively embrace another, then the phenomenon of disagreement could never be observed. If you are always constrained to construe my words in such a way that they are compatible with and reflect your own pre-understanding, then my words will always seem to you to reflect your own pre-understanding. It will appear to you that my understanding of things (as reflected in my words) is totally compatible with yours. We will appear always to agree completely. But in fact, we clearly experience disagreements between us and others. This shows clearly our ability to grasp another understanding of things other than the one we actually embrace. (Namely, it demonstrates our ability to grasp an understanding which we are firmly convinced is either mistaken or nonsensical.) And if we can do that, then clearly it is possible to interpret a biblical text from the standpoint of its author's pre-understanding rather than my own.
Skepticism is fraudulent, insincere, and anti-intelligent.
If the skepticism about the possibility of discovering the objective meaning of the biblical text is correct—that is, if one cannot step outside of one's own pre-understanding and understand another's language from any other standpoint—then not only is it impossible to arrive at the objective meaning of the biblical text, but it is impossible to arrive at the objective meaning of any language whatsoever. Hence, no communication of any kind would be possible.
Does the skeptic really believe this? Does he sincerely doubt that communication is possible when he orders scrambled eggs for breakfast, when he carries on a lengthy discussion with his friend, or when he writes a book on the impossibility of communication? Of course not! It is a theory which he espouses while his feet are on his desk and his pipe is in his mouth. But he promptly stops believing it the minute his feet hit the ground and he walks out the door. It is in this sense that this skepticism (like all forms of skepticism) is fraudulent and insincere. It is insincere because no skeptic (as evidenced by the way he actually lives his life) really believes it. It is fraudulent to the extent that the skeptic would recommend to others what he does not, in fact, embrace himself.
But there is an even more basic criticism of this skepticism. It (like all other forms of skepticism) is anti-intelligent. Let me explain:
As we saw earlier, the process of human knowing requires an initial starting point. Human knowledge requires some first-order assumptions about reality from which all other conclusions will be derived. Because these first-order assumptions are the starting-point of knowledge, they will be incapable of justification. There are no prior beliefs from which they can be derived or in terms of which they can be justified. First-order beliefs, therefore, will be the very foundation of one's understanding of reality.
There is a particular set of first-order assumptions which form the starting point for our commonsense understanding of reality.[17] It would be overly difficult to determine a complete list of these first-order beliefs of commonsense. But probably the following beliefs would be on such a list:
• The belief that I, a knower, exist.
• The belief that a world external to my own mind exists.
• The belief that the experience of my senses is directly correlated in a rational way with the outside world such that my sense experience is a reliable source of knowledge of the outside world.
• The belief that reality is rationally-ordered in such a way that the experience of other minds which exist will parallel my own experience.
Everyone who accepts a commonsensical understanding of reality accepts these beliefs, but probably none of them can be justified in terms of any of our other beliefs.[18] All our other beliefs presuppose these. They seem to be as basic and foundational as you can get. We do not hold these beliefs because they have been proved; we simply assume them as the starting-point of our knowledge.
Whereas commonsense embraces these fundamental beliefs, it is the perverse genius of skepticism to reject them. How should we respond to skepticism's rejection of the foundational assumptions of commonsense?
Surprisingly, skepticism is not illogical or unreasonable in doing so. Logic places no requirements on the assumptions it starts from. One can start from common-sense first-order assumptions such as those listed above, or one can start from the skeptical denial of these assumptions and still be perfectly logical. One is logically free to deny any assumptions whatsoever. Certainly one is logically free to reject the foundational assumptions of commonsense.
But the fallacy of skepticism is to assume that since we are logically free to deny these assumptions, we are totally free to do so. But logic is not the only constraint on what we believe. Beliefs must not only be logical, they must be intelligent as well. Skepticism is anti-intelligent, for it involves a rejection of the very foundations of human intelligence itself.
As we saw earlier, the first-order assumptions upon which commonsense is founded are not so much chosen as they are given to us. They are innate beliefs. They are built into the very structure of human intelligence by God himself.[19] We have innate "knowledge," providing the foundation of human intelligence itself, that these commonsensical beliefs are true.
Whereas the skeptic is not being illogical to deny such assumptions (he is logically free to do so), he is rebelling against the very foundation upon which his own human intelligence is founded.[20] To reject these assumptions, though not illogical, does violence to his own intelligence. It undercuts it at its foundation and paralyzes it. It is a form of intellectual suicide. Therefore, though skepticism cannot be said to be illogical, it can rightly be said to be absurd, stupid, ridiculous, silly, laughable, and pathological.
What is true of skepticism in general is true of the specific form of skepticism under discussion. Though belief in the possibility of communication is probably not itself a first-order foundational assumption, its denial must ultimately involve a skeptical rejection of beliefs that are such assumptions. Ultimately, then, skepticism about the possibility of communication is anti-intelligent in the same sense as all other skepticism.
Skepticism exaggerates the historical gap.
The proponent of the skepticism based on an exaggeration of the distance between the modern interpreter and the biblical author may object that his "skepticism" is not a true skepticism in the sense just criticized. Nor is it based on that misunderstanding of belief-formation discussed above. Rather, it is an utterly realistic appraisal of the vast historical distance which exists between the modern interpreter and the biblical author. It is a pessimistic appraisal of the powers of human intelligence and imagination in the face of that historical distance.
Earlier, in order to highlight the fact of the historical gap between author and interpreter, I stressed the distance between them. We must not minimize that distance. It is there, and it is a significant fact which Biblical interpretation must confront. But having acknowledged it, it must not be exaggerated.
The "skepticism" or "pessimism" currently under consideration blows it all out of proportion. Though the historical gap makes interpretation difficult, it does not make it impossible. To say so is to either underestimate the abilities of human intelligence and imagination, to overestimate the historical distance between author and interpreter, or both.
Though the historical gap creates distance between modern man and the biblical author, it does not create an infinite distance. In other words, it does not obliterate all common ground. Modern man necessarily shares much in common with the biblical author. Both are human beings living in the same created order. Life and human experience is fundamentally the same for both. This will always be the same no matter how far removed in time, place, language, and culture. And the possibility of understanding one another which that common ground of human existence itself makes possible can never be eclipsed by the differences which arise on other grounds. The pessimism which asserts that we cannot know the objective meaning of the biblical text has lost sight of this immense area of common ground which keeps the historical gap from becoming unbridgeable.
The skeptical objection aside, then, the first problem posed by the historical gap (namely, the problem of how to avoid misinterpreting the text out of my own pre-understanding) is solvable: The interpreter must discipline himself to adopt the pre-understanding of the human author who wrote the biblical text as the standpoint for his interpretive decisions.
the second problem: The Hermeneutical Circle
The principle that valid interpretation of a biblical text is possible only insofar as the interpreter adopts the author's pre-understanding as the standpoint from which he interprets the text results in a second problem. The principle assumes that we can discover what the pre-understanding of the biblical author was. That, in turn, assumes that we have access to the right kind and amount of information to be able to reconstruct the biblical author's pre-understanding. Is this the case? Do we have the information?
We find the historical gap opening before us once again. We know what the pre-understanding of our friends and neighbors is. Not only because it is so much like our own, but also because we have ready access to their thoughts. We talk to them daily. If we are confused about something they think, we ask them. Similarly, we know the pre-understanding of our contemporaries in other places and cultures, for (with a little effort) we can gain access to their circumstances and thinking. But the situation is different across the historical gap. Most of the information by which we could reconstruct the life, culture, circumstances, and (ultimately) the pre-understanding of the biblical authors has been lost to us in the onward march of time. The language, culture, times, and places which formed the world of the biblical authors simply do not exist any longer. They will never exist again. We cannot hop on a plane and visit them. We cannot go there in person to study them—to get absorbed into their language, time, and culture and understand it from the inside out.
This is not to suggest that human intelligence is inadequate to the task of stepping outside its own view of reality (as discussed above). This is different. This problem arises from the fact that human intelligence and imagination need something with which to work. They need some data. With data we can reconstruct the biblical world. But without it, how can we possibly do so? So the problem is this:
Given the historical gap, how can the modern interpreter find enough data from which to reconstruct the pre-understanding of the biblical author?
The kind of data that is often most important in reconstructing the pre-understanding behind a biblical text is information with regard to the theological and philosophical beliefs of the biblical author. But where is that information to be found ? Often, the only such information available is the very biblical text which I am attempting to interpret.[21] This puts the modern interpreter in what would appear to be an impossible situation. He cannot know what the biblical text means until he adopts the pre-understanding of its author. But he cannot know what the pre-understanding of its author is until he knows what this biblical text means. The historical gap, it would appear, has created a logical circle which has no point of entry. This "circle" is the fundamental problem of all hermeneutics[22] (or interpretation). It is most certainly the fundamental problem for biblical hermeneutics.
The Hermeneutical Circle[23] is the dilemma faced by the modern interpreter of the Bible: He cannot know what the biblical text means until he adopts the pre-understanding of the biblical author, but he cannot know what the pre-understanding of the biblical author is until he knows what the biblical text means.
Finding a Way Into the Hermeneutical Circle
Most approaches to biblical hermeneutics admit defeat when faced with the hermeneutical circle. They conclude that there is no way in and, hence, that the objective meaning of the biblical text is inaccessible. Then they formulate an approach to the Bible which does not require that we discover the objective meaning of the text.[24] But these approaches are wrong. We need not admit defeat to the hermeneutical circle. We are not hopelessly locked out. There is a way to break in. Two key factors which make entrance into the circle possible: 1) the power of human intelligence and imagination, and 2) textual resistance.
intelligence and Imagination
Human reason is capable of stepping outside its own beliefs and imagining what it would be like to hold a completely different set of beliefs. Therefore, human intelligence can, to a significant degree, imagine how reality might be viewed from the standpoint of a different culture, time, language, place, and worldview. This is crucial to our ability to break into the hermeneutical circle. Though we do not begin knowing what the biblical author's pre-understanding was, we have the ability to imagine various options for what it might have been. It is this capability of our imagination that opens the door for discovering the biblical author's pre-understanding.
Textual Resistance
Language, by its very nature, is an effective guide to meaning—even when one does not already share the pre-understanding out of which the text was formed. Its effectiveness stems from a property of language I will call textual resistance, a property inherent in language itself. A text, by the very nature of its language, offers resistance to any false interpretations.
Textual resistance is that property of language which eliminates all but one interpretation of a text from being a perfect match. It is that property of most texts which renders any false interpretation of that text "forced" and "unnatural."
To use an analogy, if a text is like a bolt and a possible interpretation of is like a nut, then every false interpretation will be like a nut with mismatched threads. The nut can be forced onto the bolt; but it will take force. The nut will not easily screw onto the bolt. The bolt will resist the nut's being screwed on.
False interpretations are interpretations which require different linguistic patterns in the text (i.e., different "threads") from those that actually exist in the text. There is not a perfect match. These false interpretations can be forced upon the text (some requiring more force than others), but they must be forced. The linguistic clues in the text resist them. A true interpretation, on the other hand, matches the text perfectly. It "slips" naturally and easily "onto" the text.
Like nuts and bolts, it may not always be obvious immediately when there is a mismatch
between the text and one's interpretation. It takes skill born of experience to recognize
when an interpretation (like a nut) is requiring "force" to make it fit. Though
it may require a practiced skill to see it, nevertheless, there will always be a
discernible difference between a valid interpretation and an invalid one with respect to
how naturally it construes the text being interpreted.
the ambiguity of language:
an objection
Many will want to object at this point. Language is inherently ambiguous, they say. Given the inherent ambiguity of language, there will always be more than one way to naturally construe a text. It will have several natural, unforced interpretations which can be given to it. Language is not clear, precise, and unambiguous. To assume so is naive and ignorant.
Two things need to be said in response to this objection:
First, when one raises the objection that language is ambiguous, how is the objection raised? In language, of course. How ambiguous is the language in which the objection is raised? What is the objector prepared to say? That it is so ambiguous that more than one interpretation would follow easily and naturally from his words? He would have to say so if he is to avoid contradicting himself. Yet he cannot sincerely believe that, or he would never have bothered to say anything to begin with. He would have never used language to state his objection. If he did believe it, in time he would stop trying to communicate, for communication would be impossible.
This objection—the inherent ambiguity of language—is a form of skepticism because it denies the possibility of true communication through language. As such, it can be rejected on the same grounds as all other forms of skepticism: it is fraudulent, insincere, and anti-intelligent.[25]
Second, more often than not, those who espouse the inherent ambiguity of language are confusing two different things. They confuse the inherent ambiguity of words —which is true—with the inherent ambiguity of language —which is not true.
Words by themselves, without a context, are unquestionably ambiguous. If they weren't, language would be impractical and unusable. Words need to be sufficiently ambiguous that they can be used in a large variety of different ways. This gives language the flexibility it needs to communicate that huge multitude of different ideas we want to communicate without becoming so unmanageable that it it is impossible to learn.[26]
But whereas words by themselves are inherently ambiguous, words in context are not. The context in which a word occurs gives specificity and clarity to it. The same word which alone is ambiguous and unclear is very clear and specific in any given context. It is by combining words into a unique context that we take inherently ambiguous tools, words, and use them to designate precise and unambiguous meaning.
When we speak of language, we speak of words in context, not words out of context. That is what language is—words combined into contexts. Hence, to assert that language is inherently ambiguous is to assert something far more radical than the obvious and necessary truth that words by themselves are inherently ambiguous. It is to hold the absurdly mistaken notion that words in context are inherently ambiguous. This, rather than affirming the clarity of language, is naive and ignorant.
The ambiguity objection aside, I am suggesting that the inherent powers of human intelligence and imagination, combined with the inherent effectiveness of language as a guide to its objective meaning, provide the way into the hermeneutical circle.
the process of interpretation
As long as we view the hermeneutical circle as truly a circle, it will seem impossible to gain entry. I cannot understand the text until I have reconstructed the biblical author's pre-understanding. But I cannot reconstruct his pre-understanding without first understanding the text in question. It would appear to be a real "Catch 22."
But entrance into the hermeneutical circle is possible because, ultimately, it is not a circle. It is a spiral, ending in a point. The interpreter can move back and forth between approximations of the underlying pre-understanding and approximations of the objective meaning of the text until finally he arrives at both simultaneously. His thinking about both questions converges and he discovers the answers to both questions at the same time.
The interpreter eventually comes to an interpretation of the text which irresistibly commends itself to him. But implicit in this interpretation is an account of the author's underlying pre-understanding. Embracing this interpretation necessarily involves embracing a corresponding account of the author's pre-understanding. The process of interpretation, therefore, is actually a hermeneutical funnel. It brings the interpreter to the point where both problems (the objective meaning of the text and the underlying pre-understanding) find a solution at once. We need to examine this process more closely.
Step One: Guess at biblical author's pre-understanding.
On the basis of my current understanding of the historical and cultural background of the biblical times, I, the interpreter, adopt the best assumption I can as to the biblical author's pre-understanding.[27]
The assumption I make as to the biblical author's pre-understanding is subject to two important constraints: 1) the information available about the ancient world and 2) rational consistency or coherence.
Information about the ancient world
Any Bible student eventually gains some knowledge of that world which has shaped the pre-understanding of the biblical authors—specifically, of its languages, cultures, worldview, geography, history, etc. Archaeologists and historians are continually contributing to the information we have available for reconstructing that world. Our account of the pre-understanding which underlies a text must be answerable to that stockpile of information. I cannot disregard those glimpses into the biblical world which research and scholarship have uncovered. Any account of an author's pre-understanding must be plausible in the light of what we do, in fact, know about the ancient world.
This stockpile of information, then, is my starting-point in biblical interpretation. Based on the information available, I reconstruct as best I can the biblical author's pre-understanding.[28] There will be many gaps in my account. There are points where I must speculate. But when I speculate, I take care to do so in a way that renders my speculation consistent with what reliable information about the biblical world I do have.
Undoubtedly, where I have no direct evidence, my speculations will tend to make the biblical author think and believe as I do. That, of course, may be misleading because frequently it is untrue. But it is a natural tendency. As we shall see, however, when this natural tendency has, in fact, led me astray, it eventually becomes evident that it has.
One important qualification needs to be noted. We must take care to define what it means for our account of the biblical author's pre-understanding to be answerable to the beliefs and values of the ancient world. One possibility is that we must see the understanding of the biblical author as congruent with the beliefs and values of his contemporaries—i.e., we must assume that he is a child of his time, a product of his culture. But (according to the view of biblical authority which we endorse) this cannot be. The biblical author is not a messenger of his culture; he is a messenger of God. He teaches God's perspective on reality, not that of his fellow-countrymen. Likely as not, the biblical author's beliefs will conflict with those of his culture.
To make our account of his pre-understanding answerable to the beliefs and values of the ancient world, therefore, is not to bring the author's pre-understanding into conformity with the beliefs of the ancient world, rather, it is to realize that the beliefs of his contemporaries form the context into which he speaks. In order to understand the biblical author, we must understand his message as one directed to the specific false beliefs which surrounded him. The beliefs of the ancient world were his ideological enemies. The questions he addressed, the issues he confronted, the problems he sought to solve—all these things are to be understood in terms of the questions, issues, and problems which concerned his contemporaries. The biblical author spoke directly to his own time and culture. We cannot accurately understand his message, therefore, unless we can identify that milieu of false beliefs and wrong values that he sought to challenge. It is in this sense (and only in this sense) that the biblical author's pre-understanding is to be reconstructed in the light of his contemporaries' beliefs and values.
Rational consistency, coherence
The author's pre-understanding (as I reconstruct it) should be a rationally coherent understanding of reality. In other words, I must assume that the author's understanding of reality is logically self-consistent, non-contradictory, and otherwise commonsensical in every way.
This constraint is unique to the interpretation of the Bible. It follows from the view of biblical authority which we espouse. If the understanding of reality which the biblical authors teach is the truth from God himself, then it must be rationally coherent, for rational coherence is a necessary attribute of truth. Therefore, since the Bible is an infallible revelation of truth, its message (the underlying pre-understanding of its authors) must be rationally coherent.
Step Two: Interpret text in light of the author's rationally coherent pre-understanding.
I construct the best (i.e., the most "natural") interpretation of the biblical text I can in the light of my initial account of the biblical author's pre-understanding.
Step Three: Check for textual resistance.
Being duly sensitive to textual resistance, I determine whether this interpretation meets any such resistance from the text.
As I seek to reconstruct the meaning of a biblical text, the first constraint I must answer to is the current state of reliable information on the biblical world which comes from scholarship and research. My understanding of the author's pre-understanding (and, hence, my understanding of his text) must be consistent with that information. The second constraint is rational coherence. It is necessary for the text, as I interpret it, to reflect a rationally coherent view of reality. The final constraint is the nature of the text itself. My interpretation must construe the text in that way which is most "natural" (i.e., which is least "forced").
So my interpretation must be made to answer to two different poles simultaneously:
First, my interpretation must be consistent with the most reasonable and responsible reconstruction of the author's pre-understanding that is possible.
(In order for an account of the author's pre-understanding to be a responsible one, it must reflect a rationally coherent worldview and it must be consistent with current reliable information about the biblical world.)
Second, my interpretation must be the most natural, straightforward interpretation possible of the language of the text.
The interpretive process, therefore, is the process of finding an interpretation of the text which meets both of the above requirements simultaneously. I must not "force" my interpretation of the text in order to accommodate my account of the author's pre-understanding. If, having reconstructed the author's pre-understanding as best I can, I cannot interpret the text in the light of that presumed pre-understanding without "forcing" the text, then the text is resisting that interpretation and the presumed pre-understanding which underlies it. In such a case, the text itself forces me to alter my interpretation and, correspondingly, my account of the author's pre-understanding (and perhaps even my understanding of the cultural or historical background which gave rise to that).
It is crucial, therefore, for the interpreter be alert to and discerning of textual resistance. If he cannot recognize it or is not at all bothered by it, his initial guess at the meaning of a text will almost always seem right to him. Only the interpreter who is skilled at discerning textual resistance and committed to avoiding it will find a wrong interpretation (and a correspondingly mistaken account of the biblical author's pre-understanding) revealed by the text. The unskilled interpreter will find his false interpretation seemingly validated by its plausibility, for he is totally insensitive to the subtle textual resistance which should call his wrong, but plausible interpretation into question.
Step Four: Cry "Eureka!" or adjust interpretation of text and the pre-understanding which underlies it.
If my interpretation encounters no textual resistance, then I am justified in assuming that I have discovered the objective meaning of the text, and my interpretive work is done. But if I do encounter textual resistance, I make intelligent adjustments to my interpretation and, if needed, to my account of the biblical author's pre-understanding—adjustments calculated to lead to an interpretation which will be more amenable to the language of the text (i.e, one which will construe the text in a more "natural" and "unforced" way).
One can see in this the extent of our confidence in language. We assume that an interpretation which meets no textual resistance is the valid interpretation. It is the interpretation which corresponds to what its author intended it to convey.
This assumes, of course, that I have the skill to recognize textual resistance. This is
an important assumption. Not every Bible interpreter has the requisite skill. Therefore,
one's assurance that he has reached the objective meaning of a text is only as valid as
his skill as an interpreter.
But assuming that I am a sufficiently skilled interpreter, if I meet textual resistance, then I know (as we saw above) that my current interpretation (based on my current account of the author's pre-understanding) is not valid. Consequently, I must modify both my interpretation and my account of the author's pre-understanding.
Here, again, interpretive skill comes into play. I must not make random modifications in my reconstruction of the author's pre-understanding. I must pay particularly close attention to which features of the text offer resistance to my latest interpretation. I must ask myself, "What aspects of my interpretation would need to be altered in order to lead to an interpretation which would no longer meet with this same resistance?" and correspondingly, "What aspects of the underlying pre-understanding would need to be understood differently in order to lead to an interpretation which would no longer meet with this same resistance?" I answer these questions and make modifications to my interpretation accordingly.
Repeat Steps One through Four (as necessary)
At this point the interpreter essentially repeats steps one through four trying a different, modified interpretation of the text and a correspondingly different account of the biblical author's pre-understanding with each repetition. He continues to repeat this process until finally he arrives at an interpretation which meets no textual resistance. At that point, as we have seen, he can be confident that he has arrived at the objective meaning of the text.
Observations About The Interpretive Process
Notice what has allowed this process to work:
1) I am imaginative enough to imagine a pre-understanding in the mind of the biblical author which I have never myself held.
2) I am intelligent enough to anticipate how the modifications I make in an account of the pre-understanding which underlies a text will affect the interpretation I must give to that text. (This allows me to anticipate what modifications I must make in order to render the required interpretation less forced and unnatural.)
3) I am discerning enough to notice when the language of the text offers resistance to an interpretation and, correspondingly, to the account of the author's pre-understanding which underlies it.
4) The language of the text offers resistance to any interpretation but the one which corresponds to the author's intended meaning. (This means that it also offers resistance to any account of the underlying pre-understanding other than the correct one.)
As circularly interdependent as a text's meaning and its author's pre-understanding are, the inherent magic of language combined with the abilities of human intelligence make it possible for an interpreter to arrive at an understanding of both, even when he begins with an understanding of neither. Hence, the hermeneutical "circle" only seems to lock me out. As a matter of fact, I can get in!
Two Modern Interpretive Problems
Two common problems arise from a failure to appreciate the powerful role of our pre-understanding: proof-texting and our belief in the sufficiency of plausibility.
Proof-texting
A common practice among many Christians who grant authority to the Scriptures is the practice of proof-texting. Proof-texting is citing a verse to prove a point. If I want to prove a particular doctrine or theological conviction, I cite a reference which either explicitly states that doctrine or implicitly assumes it. In theory, of course, proof-texting is a perfectly reasonable approach to persuading another of my point of view (assuming the other person grants authority to the Scriptures). The problem arises only because of my naive expectations as to what the citing of a proof-text can and will accomplish. Many people who cite a proof-text are reasoning something like this:
I believe X but person P believes Y. Why does person P believe Y? Surely he has never encountered this text T. As I understand text T, it clearly and unmistakably teaches X. If person P were to be confronted with text T, he would have no choice but to change his mind. He would reject Y and embrace X.
A proof-textor in this state of mind has not taken the influence of the pre-understanding into account. Text T "clearly and unmistakably" teaches X to the proof-textor because the pre-understanding in terms of which he has sought to understand T already includes a belief in X. If text T were interpreted through the grid of an entirely different pre-understanding (for example, through the grid of person P's pre-understanding, a pre-understanding which excludes X), no longer would T clearly and unmistakably teach X. Indeed, so interpreted, it may even clearly and unmistakably teach Y! The proof-textor's understanding of T is totally dependent on the pre-understanding he has taken to the text at the outset. Consequently, his "proof" of X will only be compelling to one who already shares his belief in X. To one who is unpersuaded of X, this "proof" of X will have little influence. Person P will be just as unpersuaded of the proof-textor's interpretation of T as he is of X to begin with.
Proof-texting, therefore, will be a frustrating and futile endeavor to one who is unaware of the role and impact of the pre-understanding on biblical interpretation. In order to engage in the citing of proof-texts profitably, one must be ready and able to go back and defend the assumptions which underlie his interpretation of the proof text. If one is ready and able to do that, then he can responsibly (and perhaps even effectively) use proof-texts. If one is unwilling or unable to do so, proof-texting is of virtually no avail. And if, in his naivete, one sees no need to defend his assumptions, the failure of his proof-texts to persuade will be totally mystifying to him.
Belief in the Sufficiency of Plausibility
Having persuaded another (say, person P) that your interpretation of a text is flawlessly reasonable, it is not uncommon to have him reject your interpretation nonetheless, on the grounds that his preferred interpretation of the text is perfectly plausible too. The logic of his rejection of your interpretation runs something like this:
Sure, your interpretation is plausible. But my interpretation is plausible too. Therefore, since both interpretations are plausible, there is no greater need for me to be persuaded of your interpretation than for you to be persuaded of mine. Since we have reached a standstill and I am just as justified in believing my interpretation as you are in believing yours, then I see no need to change my mind.
The problem with this line of reasoning is its naive acceptance of "plausibility" as an adequate standard for the validity of an interpretation. Few interpretations of the biblical text are implausible. No intelligent human being, sincere in his efforts to understand the biblical text, would recommend or embrace a totally implausible interpretation. Any interpretation which is logically consistent with the set of assumptions which the interpreter takes to the text (i.e. with his pre-understanding) will be a plausible one.[29]
If interpretation H follows logically from the assumption of J, K, and L, then one can readily see that, assuming J, K, and L, the text must mean H. In other words, interpretation H is plausible if it can be seen that it is the correct interpretation of the text on the assumption that J, K, and L are true. Now oftentimes it is not far-fetched to think that J, K, and L might be true. Consequently, there can be scores of plausible interpretations of any single passage of the Bible. Each plausible pre-understanding will have a different plausible interpretation of the text corresponding to it. Therefore, being satisfied that one has reached a valid interpretation of a text because he has reached a plausible interpretation is extremely naive.
Probability, not plausibility is the appropriate basis for adopting an interpretation. One is justified in embracing an interpretation only when that interpretation has the highest likelihood of being in conformity with the author's intent.[30] The remainder of this book is our attempt to spell out further how one determines the likelihood of an interpretation's conforming to the author's intent. For my purposes here, it is only necessary to note the role of our pre-understanding in this whole process.
If I interpret a text from a pre-understanding which is significantly different from the assumptions from which the author wrote that text, though my interpretation will undoubtedly be plausible, there is no possibility that it will be correct. The difference between a merely plausible interpretation and the correct one is this: a correct interpretation is informed by a pre-understanding which conforms to that which the author had when writing the text; a merely plausible interpretation is informed by an alien pre-understanding, one which does not conform to that which the author had. A plausible interpretation is one which could, in fact, be the correct one. It would be the correct one if the pre-understanding which gave rise to it was identical to the one out of which the author wrote. That is precisely why it is a plausible interpretation.[31] But the big "if" remains. It would be correct only if the pre-understanding which informed it were the correct one.
The purpose of the remainder of this book is to elaborate further on the interpretive process described above, the process by which the interpreter can know when the pre-understanding he is employing in his interpretation conforms to the one the author had when composing the text.
The Hermeneutic of Biblical Authority[32]
Two major factors shape the approach to biblical interpretation which we are espousing in this book: 1) our understanding as to the way in which verbal communication works, i.e., our philosophy of language; and 2) our view of biblical authority, i.e., our belief in the absolute authority of the Bible—its infallibility and total inerrancy.
In this section I use what we have learned about the role of the pre-understanding in verbal communication (combined with our assumptions about biblical authority) to show how the hermeneutic of biblical authority which we espouse is the most rational and commonsensical approach relative to all the alternative theories.
In order to list, systematically, all the theoretical options, we need to return to a previous concept. The different approaches people take to biblical hermeneutics are finally determined by how they confront the problem of the historical gap. The different theoretical approaches to biblical interpretation can be outlined as follows:
I. Hermeneutic of neutrality
II. Hermeneutic of commitment
A. Hermeneutic of subjectivity
B. Hermeneutic of orthodoxy
C. Hermeneutic of authorial intent
1. Hermeneutic of dialogue
2. Hermeneutic of biblical authority
The first choice an interpreter makes is whether he will embrace a hermeneutic of commitment or a hermeneutic of neutrality.
Hermeneutic of Neutrality
As we have seen, the historical gap is a problem because of the inevitable difference between the pre-understanding of the biblical author and that of his modern interpreter. How can the modern interpreter ever hope to arrive at the objective meaning of a text (that which the biblical author intended) when his interpretation is always being skewed by the presence of his own personal beliefs and commitments?
One solution which has been proposed is for the modern interpreter to rid himself of any and all assumptions as he enters into the interpretive task. He must shed all preconceptions, commitments, and beliefs. He must become absolutely neutral and non-committal with respect to any and all ideas. Having done so, he will have made himself open and amenable to the biblical author's ideas. He will have placed himself in a position to hear and understand the biblical author without his own personal preconceptions entering in to skew the message of the text. This approach is what I shall call the hermeneutic of neutrality.
The goal of the hermeneutic of neutrality is a noble one—namely, to counteract the tendency of our own pre-understanding to lead us away from the objective meaning of the biblical text. We are in total agreement with its goal. The problem with the hermeneutic of neutrality, however, is that it is naively unrealistic. It is based on complete ignorance of the way in which verbal communication actually takes place.
First, there is the simple fact that true neutrality is not even conceivable. What could it possibly mean to approach the task of interpretation with absolutely no prior assumptions? It is impossible to know what that would even look like. No matter how much, by focusing on it, we may have achieved neutrality on a particular issue,[33] there will be dozens of other issues (outside the scope of our attention) where our commitments and beliefs are still very much intact. If nothing else, we have hundreds of prior assumptions as to the meanings of words in the language we are using. Total neutrality is simply not a realizable goal. It is psychologically impossible.
Second, even if it were realizable, it would not be desirable. As negative an influence as the interpreter's pre-understanding can be (skewing the meaning of the biblical text), nonetheless, its positive contribution to the process of interpretation far outweighs its potential negative influence. The existence of our pre-understanding makes learning and knowledge possible. Similarly, biblical interpretation would not be possible without it. Without the operation of our pre-understanding, we would be completely paralyzed before the task of interpretation.
Imagine approaching the text of John 3:16 from the standpoint of total neutrality, a standpoint which assumes absolutely nothing :
For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. (NIV)
Having assumed nothing, we have no idea what John means by "God" (even if we grant our "total neutrality" to allow a basic understanding of the English language). Who or what is "God"? What exactly is John's conception of God. We cannot assume that it is like the traditional Judeo-Christian conception of God which has come down to us through history. Perhaps it is very different. It would be violating our neutrality to assume that John's conception coincided with ours.
And what about "Son"? John's notion of a "son" of God cannot be assumed to correspond to any modern notions of sonship relative to God. Neither can we assume that Jesus is in view here without violating our neutrality (not even when we take the context of John 3 into account). Our previous belief that Jesus is the Son of God makes us think immediately that this verse is referring to Jesus.
We could go on and illustrate the same thing with respect to every word in this verse. The point is this: Our pre-understanding makes Bible interpretation feasible by giving us a head-start on the meaning of the text. From past learning and experience, we know (or, more accurately, think we know) what the biblical author means by most of the concepts to which he refers in his text. If we were not allowed to assume that we understand these concepts, each verse would present us with a monumental task. To interpret one verse would be such an intimidating prospect that we would never even begin. We would be overwhelmed to the point of inactivity.
An objection may be raised to the use of our pre-understanding in interpretation: We use assumptions in our Bible interpretation, but only after having begun from the neutral standpoint which the hermeneutic of neutrality espouses. We now assume that we understand John's conception of God, sonship to God, etc. But, if our assumptions are justified, it is because previous study has led us to some convictions as to how to understand these notions in John's teaching. We started from total neutrality; we did not simply assume that John's notions corresponded with the traditional understanding of these notions. Before we felt justified in understanding John's notions along the lines of the traditional ones, we set the traditional notions aside and proved to ourselves (from a direct study of the biblical texts) that John's notions did, in fact, coincide with them. At least, this is what we should have done!
The point raised in this objection is largely true, but misleading. It works as an objection only because of the technical nature of the examples I used. What if we focus on different words and concepts in John 3:16? What about "life," "world, "perish," "believe," "gave"? To what extent did we ever set aside our conceptions of these and prove to ourselves (from the biblical text alone) what the strictly biblical conceptions of these words involves? Indeed, to what extent could this have been done ?
Try it. Try to become absolutely neutral with respect to the meaning of the word "gave." Now do a word study, remaining absolutely neutral at every point along the way to make sure your own preconceptions do not mislead you. It is virtually impossible. Without a preconception already given you by a knowledge of the English language you are at a loss to know what to conclude. You are utterly dependent upon your pre-understanding of the meaning of words. This is as it should be. This is exactly how language works. Verbal communication is possible only because the one communicating can assume his listener has a pre-understanding of the meaning of words. Total neutrality, rather than being an aid to understanding, would render verbal communication impossible.
Therefore, neutrality is hardly the ideal standpoint from which to understand a text. Neutrality paralyzes. It erodes the foundations upon which verbal communication is based. Neither is it realizable. The minute we use language, we have departed from total neutrality. Instead, the ideal standpoint from which to understand a text is the one which the author is assuming of his reader. To know, understand, and believe what the author assumes you know, understand, and believe is that ideal standpoint from which to interpret a text. It is to have exactly those pre-conceptions and commitments which he has assumed you have. Only then are you in the best position to understand the author's text. This is not the standpoint of neutrality. This is a standpoint of commitment. Any theory of interpretation which acknowledges the impossibility and impracticality of total neutrality and which has an intelligent grasp of the essential role which the interpreter's pre-understanding plays in the interpretive task is what we will call a hermeneutic of commitment.
Faced with two theoretical options—the hermeneutic of neutrality or a hermeneutic of commitment —we clearly side with the latter. Our philosophy of language requires it. The hermeneutic of neutrality is utterly ignorant of the true nature of verbal communication.
Hermeneutic of commitment
Given that we reject the hermeneutic of neutrality in favor of a hermeneutic of commitment, there remain three options for a theory of biblical interpretation: 1) the hermeneutic of subjectivity; 2) the hermeneutic of orthodoxy; and 3) the hermeneutic of authorial intent.
The Hermeneutic of Subjectivity
The historical gap threatens to render the objective meaning of the biblical text inaccessible. But perhaps the objective meaning of the text is not what God intended for us to concern ourselves with. Perhaps God intended that we each interpret the Bible in the light of our own pre-understanding. The true, God-given message of the Bible is what it means to each one of us, individually, as we interpret it in the light of our own unique pre-understanding. Perhaps what the Bible means to me is precisely what God intended it to mean. This not uncommon perspective on the Bible is what we shall call the hermeneutic of subjectivity. Under this view, the Bible is a catalyst to my own personal revelation from God.
The hermeneutic of subjectivity certainly solves the problem created by the historical gap: I can ignore both the biblical author's pre-understanding and the objective meaning of the text, for neither is of any concern to me. My only concern is the meaning of the text as interpreted in the light of my own pre-understanding, to which access is unproblematic.
The problem with the hermeneutic of subjectivity arises when we try to reconcile this hermeneutic with our view of biblical authority. One of the fundamental features of the inerrantist's view of biblical authority is that the Bible has a single, coherent, objective meaning, available to all universally and absolutely authoritative. This view of biblical authority cannot be reconciled with the hermeneutic of subjectivity, which sees the relevant meaning of the biblical text as fundamentally subjective. The biblical text will not and cannot have one, single, coherent, objective meaning for all interpreters universally. It means a significantly different thing to each interpreter, who brings a significantly different pre-understanding to the text. This is a clearly logical consequence of the hermeneutic of subjectivity. Consequently, anyone who is convinced of the traditional view of biblical authority—where the Bible conveys an objective message possessing absolute, infallible authority—cannot opt for the hermeneutic of subjectivity.
The hermeneutic of subjectivity reduces the Bible to a completely private book useful only for private edification; the Bible is rendered useless as an authoritative source of rebuke or criticism. I could never, on the basis of the Bible's teaching, criticize another person or institution for failing to conform to the biblical standard, for what the Bible says, it says only to me.
The Hermeneutic of Orthodoxy
The hermeneutic of orthodoxy solves the problem of the historical gap in a completely different way. The hermeneutic of subjectivity—interpreting the Bible in the light of our own pre-understanding—leads to relativism. According to it, there is no single, objective meaning of the text. The message differs, depending upon who is interpreting it. Our biblical hermeneutic must provide a basis for a universally uniform interpretation if we are to do justice to our notion of the Bible as an objective authority—an authority which does not change its message relative to the individual interpreter.
The hermeneutic of orthodoxy provides just such a basis. It offers a unique solution to the historical gap in a way that does not lead to relativism: a standardized pre-understanding. According to the hermeneutic of orthodoxy, one must neither interpret the text from the standpoint of one's own individual pre-understanding, nor interpret it from the standpoint of the biblical author. Rather, one is to interpret the text from the standpoint of a prescribed pre-understanding. The church or religious tradition in which one stands artificially creates a uniform pre-understanding (which, for reasons we have discussed, will tend toward a uniform interpretation of the text) by prescribing that pre-understanding which the Bible student is to adopt when interpreting the biblical text. The spirit of orthodoxy says, "Read your Bible for yourself, but read it this way." Creeds, confessions, and both spoken and unspoken traditions are various guides to the pre-understanding which the "true" believer will and must adopt. There are also various ways in which the prescribed pre-understanding is enforced on the interpreter.
The clear advantage of the hermeneutic of orthodoxy is that it narrows the historical gap immensely without degenerating into relativism. It does not eliminate the gap completely, but it narrows it to manageable proportions. The Bible is clearly an ancient document, written in a time and place completely and totally alien to us. This is not so of the traditions, creeds, and confessions which define the various brands of orthodoxy. These creeds and traditions (in the form in which they are currently employed) are old, but they are not ancient. The fundamentally modern authors who composed these traditions (and even more so those who interpret these traditions to us) are not totally alien to us. We know them. We understand them. They are like us in many respects. To a large degree, we live in the same intellectual and theological world. Those differences which do exist can easily be understood and bridged by the vast amount of information available to us about their times and cultures.
This is very different from the situation with the Bible. Interpretation in accordance with the hermeneutic of orthodoxy, therefore, is not so problematic as interpretation which insists on capturing the biblical author's intent: to interpret the Bible validly one need only understand the relatively modern worldview which has given rise to one's preferred brand of orthodoxy. There is no need to gain access to the obscurity of the ancient biblical world.
Once again, the hermeneutic of orthodoxy collides head-on with our conception of the nature of biblical authority. Our view is that the text of scripture itself bears the authoritative message from God. God's word is inscribed in the biblical text. It is this inscribed text which has objective authority over our lives and beliefs. The hermeneutic of orthodoxy shifts the locus of authority. The authority no longer rests in the biblical text, but in the text of the confessions or creeds which define that orthodoxy. Or, if there is no written text by which the orthodoxy is defined, then it rests in the unwritten (perhaps even unspoken) "text" of the tradition which defines it. The orthodox believer's interpretations, then, are shaped by a pre-understanding which has been authoritatively defined for him by his orthodoxy. The true authority, therefore, rests in the orthodoxy itself—in the prescribed pre-understanding which every orthodox believer must adopt. This is not consistent with the traditional view[34] of biblical authority. In the traditional view, the Bible alone is the sole source of objective revelation.
No matter how much he might protest, the Protestant believer who is committed to a creed is just as much a practitioner of the hermeneutic of orthodoxy as the Roman Catholic. He objects, of course, that he does not grant any authority to the creed. He uses the creed as merely a helpful grid through which to begin reading and understanding his Bible. This objection is believable if his creed is not above challenge. But is this usually the case? How often are Protestant creeds revised on the grounds that they are mistaken? If not often, why not? Because they are such an impeccably perfect representation of the coherent, unified message of the Bible? All of the creeds, mutually contradictory as they are, cannot be perfect. And how do the adherents know that their creeds are perfect? Have they verified them through a Bible read in the light of them? That's no good. That is circular. Of course my Bible study will confirm my creed if I assume my creed as the only standpoint from which the Bible can be read. Or have they verified their creed from the authorial intent of the biblical text? Though not impossible, I think it highly unlikely that most Protestants have validated the creeds to which they are committed through independent discovery of what was intended by the biblical authors. If I am right, then these Protestants are practitioners of the hermeneutic of orthodoxy.
In any case, one cannot consistently hold to the traditional view of biblical authority (which involves the absolute authority of the biblical text) and at the same time espouse the hermeneutic of orthodoxy. The two are irreconcilable.
The Hermeneutic of Authorial Intent
The final option, the one we believe to be uniquely consistent with our philosophy of language and our view of biblical authority, is the hermeneutic of authorial intent. This hermeneutic faces squarely into the need to arrive at the objective meaning of the text if one is to have an authoritative biblical message which is both truly objective (universally available) and truly present in the biblical text. Under this hermeneutic, therefore, the historical gap is a very important problem. In order to arrive at the objective meaning of the text, the interpreter must capture the author's intent in the text. To do that, he must come to an understanding of the underlying pre-understanding of the author. To do that, he must bridge the vast chasm which exists between the biblical world and today.
I have already shown why it is possible to transverse this chasm, and I have laid out the process that makes it so. The historical gap, therefore, contrary to popular opinion, does not make the hermeneutic of authorial intent impossible nor impractical. This is the hermeneutic we espouse in this text.
There are actually two different forms of the hermeneutic of authorial intent worth mentioning: the hermeneutic of dialogue and the hermeneutic of biblical authority. Both forms are valid and useful in the right contexts. But only the hermeneutic of biblical authority is appropriate to a study of the Bible. A common mistake being made today is to apply the hermeneutic of dialogue to the study of the Bible.
Both the hermeneutic of biblical authority and the hermeneutic of dialogue strive to determine the biblical author's intent in the language of the Bible. They differ in how they propose to respond to that message once they have determined what it is. The hermeneutic of dialogue proposes to dialogue with the text as with a peer; the hermeneutic of biblical authority proposes to submit to the text as to an authoritative teacher—indeed, as to the Lord himself.
Hermeneutic of dialogue
To understand this difference between the hermeneutic of dialogue and the hermeneutic of biblical authority, imagine how we might interact with an ancient text—a text which is equally as ancient as the Bible, but to which we grant no real authority. Take, for example, the works of Plato. What do we hope to gain by studying them? And how do we interact with them?
Our concern in studying Plato (as it should be in any intellectual pursuit) is truth. We desire to learn the truth about life and reality. But how can Plato help us? Is Plato the source of truth? Does Plato have an infallible grasp on everything we need to know? Certainly not. In one important sense, Plato is our peer. He is just as fallible and human as we. So we do not go to Plato in order to believe whatever he teaches. That would be folly. We go to Plato to look at the reasonings and conclusions of a very brilliant man. Even if his conclusions and reflections are not ultimately the truth, they are certainly worth listening to.
Plato was brilliant, a profound and stimulating thinker. By looking into his mind and seeing how he views life and reality and by seeing the questions which he asks, my own thinking will be stimulated. To "dialogue" with this great thinker, my own perspective will be broadened, stretched, and challenged. I will be stimulated to pursue new and different philosophical vistas. All of this will aid me in my own quest after truth. Perhaps, in dialogue with Plato, I will be stimulated to some new insight which is indeed true. That is what I seek. That is what is important.
In summary, then, I am interested in Plato because I am interested in dialogue with him. But in dialogue, I must listen to what the other has to say. Consequently, the goal I set in the study of Plato's works is to understand what he was intending to say. I strive to understand the message which he actually put there—i.e., I strive to grasp the objective meaning of his writings.[35]
But, as I have just been saying, I do not trust that the objective meaning of Plato's dialogues will be the truth. I trust only that it will be provocative, stimulating, and helpful in my own quest for understanding the truth.[36] Consequently, with Plato, it is not ultimately important whether I have determined the objective meaning of his text. If I have reached it, great. If not, that's all right too. Ultimately nothing important is at stake. The reason I am reading him in the first place is for the spiritual and intellectual stimulation—for the help along the road to true understanding. If this help and stimulation results from my misconstruing Plato and not from what Plato actually intended, so be it! My primary objective has nevertheless been achieved. My dialogue with Plato (however unfair to Plato) has nevertheless been stimulating and helpful. And if it is in misunderstanding him that I am led to a further understanding of truth, then so much the better for misunderstanding. Such a fortuitous error would be infinitely better than an accurate interpretation which profited me nothing in my quest after truth.
Hermeneutic of biblical authority
Consider how different the situation is for the Bible student who believes that infallible truth is contained in the biblical text itself. The motivation is no longer (as in the case of Plato) to merely carry on a stimulating dialogue with the biblical authors. The motivation is to uncover the objective, authoritative statement of truth which resides in the text itself. Turning from Plato to the Bible, I no longer presume that some of what it says will be wrong. I presume to find nothing but truth there. I do not study the Bible as a stimulus to finding truth wherever it may be; I study the Bible precisely because the truth is there. The biblical authors (unlike Plato) are not my peers. They are not writing as my equals—fallible human beings groping in the dark for some glimmer of the truth. I do not read them because they are intelligent and profound fellow-students of life with much worthy insight into the truth. Rather, I submit to them as to authoritative teachers. I am prepared to believe whatever it is they believe. I am prepared to discard whatever they say to discard.
My basis for trusting them so implicitly is their role as prophets and apostles. They have been given supernatural insight by God into the objective truth about life and reality. Their insight is not based on their native ability as thinkers; it is based on their chosen function by God—to be his messengers.
This shift in assumptions and purpose alter drastically the importance of determining the author's intent.[37] In Plato, if I make a mistake as to Plato's intent, not much is lost (in fact, something may even be gained). In the Bible, if I make a mistake as to the biblical author's intent, then I am misled into assuming the wrong teaching to be the authoritative word of God. This is a very grave error.
The need to carefully determine the author's true intent becomes the all-important problem for biblical hermeneutics.
The Proper Hermeneutic for Interpreting the Bible
We have just described two different approaches: the hermeneutic of biblical authority and the hermeneutic of dialogue. The hermeneutic of dialogue, the approach that we would take to Plato, is the approach that one should take to any non-authoritative literature. The hermeneutic of biblical authority, by its very nature, is unique. Its approach to the text is shaped by the uniqueness of the literature it is attempting to interpret. It is only applicable to literature which possesses absolute authority—the Bible.
Therefore, a Bible student who fails to acknowledge the absolute authority of the Bible (but who acknowledges the legitimacy of the hermeneutic of authorial intent) logically must interpret it in accordance with the hermeneutic of dialogue. This would be the only consistent approach he could take. But the Bible student who does recognize its authority must employ the hermeneutic of biblical authority. Given his assumptions with respect to biblical authority, this is the only legitimate approach he can take. Were the Bible student to approach the text from the hermeneutic of dialogue, his interpretive approach would be totally inconsistent with the view of Biblical authority he espouses.[38]
The theoretical options available for a biblical hermeneutic are prompted by different views of the nature of language and biblical authority, different perspectives on the goal of biblical interpretation and how to manage one's pre-understanding in the process of interpretation, and different solutions to the